Double-edged Sanctions: China and the Rare Earths Card
On Wednesday, the US Senate advanced past the second reading of a bill tightening unilateral sanctions against Russia and Iran, with attention focused on Moscow and Tehran. But the trigger for the next global technological crisis lies neither in the Kremlin nor in the Islamic Republic: it is in Beijing, where China holds the key to rare earths. The ammunition in this case is not missiles, but minerals.
According to Jake Werner, director of the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, China has a retaliation roadmap on the table that could cut the supply of rare earths to the United States — the same mechanism it has used before — and respond with proportionate tariffs and sanctions. The question is no longer whether there will be a response, but when and with what intensity.
The legislation advancing in the US Senate is no minor measure. It grants the administration the power to impose crippling secondary tariffs and sweeping secondary sanctions against any country maintaining significant commercial ties with Russia. In practice, it turns China — Moscow’s largest trading partner — into a direct target. Werner puts it bluntly: if these tools are fully applied against Beijing, they would lead to a crisis in the bilateral relationship.
The White House’s political calculus, however, introduces a crucial nuance. Werner argues that as long as Trump seeks a less confrontational relationship with China, he will hold back from taking the most damaging measures. In other words, the bill is a loaded weapon, but the US executive can choose not to fire. That deliberate ambiguity — passing tough legislation while moderating its enforcement — is precisely the scenario Beijing is watching with patience.
China’s Strategy: Condemn, Wait, and Strike If Necessary
Beijing’s predictable response, according to the Quincy Institute’s analysis, will follow a three-step logic. First, a public condemnation of the bill as a violation of the principle of sovereignty through an extraterritorial assertion of US law. Second, a strategic wait: China will not take concrete retaliatory action until the Trump administration actually exercises the powers the legislation confers. And third, if that happens, the response will be asymmetric and surgical.
The nuance Werner uses to describe the scenario — China would again cut off US access to rare earth exports — is no accident. Beijing has used this lever before, and the precedent is well known in Washington. America’s dependence on Chinese critical minerals has not been resolved; it has deepened, precisely at a time when the race for artificial intelligence and semiconductor manufacturing makes supply chains more vulnerable than ever.
Rare Earths: The Asymmetric Weapon of Choice
The uniqueness of rare earths as a geopolitical instrument lies in the fact that there is no real short-term alternative. China controls a dominant share of global production of these minerals — and for certain specific elements, such as dysprosium or terbium, its dominance is even greater. They are indispensable for high-power magnets, electric motors, wind turbines, defense systems, and increasingly for advanced semiconductor manufacturing and AI components.
A supply cut would not just paralyze the consumer electronics industry. It would affect chip production, the data centers powering language models, and America’s very ability to maintain its technological edge. In short, it is a weapon that strikes directly at the heart of digital sovereignty: whoever controls critical minerals ultimately controls who builds the technology of the future.
The irony is that the US bill, designed to weaken Russia, may end up accelerating a crisis in the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century. Werner sums it up precisely: the legislation has the potential to trigger a crisis in US-China relations. And that crisis, if it comes, will not be fought in the South China Sea or over Taiwan, but at the ports where cargo ships loaded with minerals dock.
The Geopolitical Backdrop: Ukraine as the Context
The legislation does not emerge in a vacuum. While the Senate moved forward on tightening sanctions, Russia continued its campaign against Ukraine: according to the Times of Israel, Moscow launched ballistic missiles and drones against Kyiv, killing at least nine people. Russian air defense, for its part, has repelled multiple Ukrainian drone incursions in July, according to state agency TASS.
This wartime context explains the US Congress’s urgency to project firmness. But it also reveals the paradox of Western strategy: the more Russia is squeezed through secondary sanctions, the more China is pushed toward an economic alliance with Moscow that Beijing is not actively seeking, but will not reject if Washington forces it to choose.
It should be noted that Werner’s statements reach us through the Russian state agency TASS, a media outlet controlled by the Moscow government. Although the Quincy Institute is an independent think tank based in Washington and its analysis is consistent with known geopolitical logic, it was not possible to corroborate these claims with additional independent sources at the time of writing.
Patience as Strategy
The Chinese move, according to Werner’s analysis, is not immediate response but calculated waiting. Beijing will condemn the bill — it needs to in order to maintain its sovereignty narrative against the extraterritoriality of US law — but it will not make a move until the Trump administration demonstrates whether it is willing to use the tools Congress has placed in its hands.
That prudence reveals a cold reading of the balance of power. China knows the United States depends on its rare earths; it also knows Trump has publicly expressed his desire to avoid an open confrontation with Beijing. China’s strategy is to let Washington be the one to make the mistake of crossing the line, and then respond with a proportionality that leaves no room for rhetorical escalation.
An Announced Crisis That Can Still Be Avoided
The history of US-China relations over the past decade is the history of announced crises that rarely fully materialize. The trade war, the chip dispute, tensions over Taiwan: all had moments of maximum strain, and all found a point of equilibrium before total collapse. This sanctions bill may follow the same pattern — provided Trump decides not to deploy the most destructive tools — or it may become the trigger no one wants.
What is clear is that Western dependence on Chinese critical minerals is not a problem that punitive legislation will solve. It is solved with investment in alternative mining, recycling, research into substitute materials, and an industrial policy that does not outsource technological sovereignty. In the meantime, Beijing holds the key to the rare earths cabinet, and the US Senate has just reminded it that it knows where the lock is. The question is not whether China will use that key, but what price Washington will be willing to pay to ensure it does not.